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Do Temporary Agency Workers Affect Workplace Performance? 
 
Alex Bryson† 
 
Abstract  
Using nationally representative workplace data we find the use of temporary agency workers 
(TAW) is positively associated with financial performance in the British private sector and 
weakly associated with higher sales per employee.  However TAW is not associated with 
value added per employee.  Employees in workplaces with TAW receive higher wages than 
observationally equivalent employees in non-TAW workplaces.  But the presence of TAW in 
the employee's occupation is associated with lower wages for employees in that occupation.  
Furthermore, conditioning on wages, the presence of TAW at the workplace is associated 
with lower job satisfaction and higher job anxiety among employees.  These findings are 
consistent with TAW having an adverse effect on employees' experiences at work, perhaps 
due a more labour intensive regime, one which is only partly compensated for with higher 
wages. 
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I. Introduction 
According to the Financial Times “sub-contracting as many non-core activities as 
possible is a central element of the new economy” (31st July 2001, page 10). Inter alia this has 
entailed rapid growth in temporary agency working over the last two decades in Britain 
(Millward et al., 2000: 47; Heywood et al., 2006; Forde and Slater, 2005), as it has in the 
United States (Segal and Sullivan, 1997).1  Today there are well over one-quarter of a million 
temporary agency workers (TAW) in Britain accounting for over 1 percent of the total 
workforce.  According to the workplace-based data used in this paper, by 2004 10 percent of 
private sector workplaces were using TAW.  In 7 percent of private sector workplaces (70 
percent of workplaces using any TAW), TAW were equivalent to 5 percent or more of 
employees at the workplace.  Yet there is very little evidence on the links between TAW and 
workplace financial performance and labour productivity.  This paper fills this gap in the 
literature using nationally representative workplace and employee data for Britain, the biggest 
user of TAW in Europe (European Foundation, 2006). 
The paper is organised in the following way.  Section II discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the links between TAW and workplace productivity and performance.  
Section III introduces the data and outlines the estimation strategy.  Section IV presents 
results and Section V discusses the implications of the findings and concludes. 
 
II. Use of  TAW and Workplace Performance 
Commentators and academics identify four broad reasons for TAW usage which 
imply financial gains to firms.  First, TAW are viewed as a cost-cutting device since  TAW 
                                                 
1 For reviews of the reasons for the growth in temporary agency working see Forde and Slater (2005) and 
Forde (2008). 
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receive lower wages than their employee counterparts (Forde and Slater, 2006; Autor and 
Houseman, 2005) and, until recently, employers using TAW were not obliged to extend 
employees’ non-wage benefits such as pensions to them, thus potentially foregoing 
substantial non-wage labour costs where they substitute for employees.2  Houseman et al. 
(2003) showed for the USA that TAW depress wage increases among employees when 
labour markets are tight. However, employers must pay agency fees.  These can be 
substantial, mitigating any savings made in wage and non-wage benefits (Houseman, 2001).   
Second, TAW can be deployed quickly to meet fluctuations in product or service 
demand.  The costs of firing TAW are minimal in Britain offering employers opportunities 
to ‘buffer’ themselves when faced with market uncertainty arising from factors such as 
turbulent market conditions, intensifying market competition and uncertainties surrounding 
the success of new products and services.  In this sense, TAW offer labour flexibility – often 
termed ‘external’ flexibility since it allows employers to adjust the amount of labour they use 
to market needs relatively quickly and cheaply without affecting the employment status of 
permanent ‘core’ employees (Houseman et al., 2003; Atkinson, 1984).  Thus this second 
rationale is linked to the first of cost minimisation.   
Third, TAW are used as ‘cover’ or ‘fill in’ for short to medium-term absence arising 
from maternity and paternity leave, sickness and illness and the like. TAW can thus 
contribute to the smooth-running of the workplace by maintaining uninterrupted production 
or provision of services when employees are temporarily absent.  The continuity this brings 
allows customers to be served and machinery to continue in operation when the absence of 
TAW might otherwise have resulted in temporary closure or operating below capacity.   
                                                 
2 This is not the case in all EU states (TUC, 2005) and the situation changed in the UK on 1st October 2011 
when the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 came into force.  After 12 weeks in a given job an agency worker 
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Fourth, the optimal mix of skills at the workplace may shift in ways that make it 
uneconomic to retain or recruit groups of workers on permanent contracts, but whose 
deployment is economically viable on a temporary basis. Thus TAW are used for specialist 
skills not normally available among employees.  Under this scenario it would not be 
surprising to find highly skilled TAW, including ‘knowledge workers’, offering skills that 
complement those of permanent employees. 
TAW might also have a positive effect on labour productivity.  This may occur if 
TAW are potential substitutes for existing employees, thus threatening permanent 
employees’ job security and acting as a spur to improve incumbents’ performance.  
Alternatively, TAW may complement employees’ skills in a productivity-enhancing fashion.  
For instance, during times of demand uncertainty they may ‘buffer’ employees thus allowing 
them to concentrate efficiently on core activities.  More generally, firms may raise the 
average productivity of the firm when they concentrate on core activities where they have a 
comparative advantage, contracting out those aspects of their work where they operate less 
efficiently - what Amiti and Wei (2006) describe as a productivity gain arising from 
compositional change in the workforce. Employers may also use TAW as a pool from which 
to draw their employees, whereupon TAW can help them manage the risk of making 
permanent offers by screening TAW to ensure suitable job matches (Autor, 2001). 
TAW can also militate against good workplace performance.   TAW may be less 
productive than their employee counterparts if, as some have argued, they are less 
committed to the firm, have lower job satisfaction, or take time to acquire the firm-specific 
skills required by the employer.  TAW may have unintended negative spill-over effects on 
employees, as might occur where employee job insecurity arising from TAW leads to 
                                                                                                                                                 
is entitled to equal treatment with respect to basic working and employment conditions that would apply to a 
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employee unrest or dissatisfaction.  A TAW-based strategy geared towards numerical 
flexibility may militate against a strategy based on functional flexibility, or result in a 
reduction in innovative capacity, as Hempell and Zwick (2005) found in Germany. 
Even if the labour productivity effects of TAW are benign or positive, any 
productivity benefits may be outweighed by the cost of using them.  This might happen if, 
for example, the start-up costs of training TAW outweigh the productivity benefits, or if 
TAW are actually paid more than incumbent employees because the demand for specialist 
TAW means their spot-market price is higher than the wages set for like permanent 
employees. 
There is very little evidence on the effects of TAW on workplace performance and 
productivity.  Instead the literature is dominated by papers that consider the effects of 
numerical and functional flexibility on performance.  These studies tend to define numerical 
flexibility in a variety of ways but the broad consensus is that numerical flexibility is 
associated with poorer performance whereas functional flexibility is associated with better 
performance.3  Some studies point to positive productivity effects of contracting out (Siegel, 
1995; ten Raa and Wolff, 2001). Amiti and Wei (2006) suggest that off-shoring (sourcing 
service inputs from overseas suppliers) increased labour productivity in the US 
manufacturing sector over the period 1992-2000. 4  Using data on UK manufacturing plants 
for the period 1980-1992 Girma and Gorg (2004) find that an establishment’s outsourcing 
intensity is positively related to its labour productivity and total factor productivity growth, 
and this effect is more pronounced for foreign establishments.  
                                                                                                                                                 
worker recruited directly by the employer to occupy the same job. 
3 This is the case with respect to productivity in Britain (Michie and Sheehan, 1999, 2001) and the USA 
(Chadwick and Cappelli, 2002).  
4 There is growing evidence that productivity growth in the US manufacturing sector has been over-estimated 
due to the outsourcing of labour to temporary agency firms (Dey, Houseman and Polivka, 2006; Houseman, 
2006). 
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Very few studies deal directly with the effects of TAW because data on TAW use is 
absent from most data sets.  Those studies that do consider TAW effects find mixed results.  
Kleinknecht et al. (2006) find different effects of the percentage of hours worked by TAW 
on sales growth according to the presence of R&D at the enterprise.  It seems that, in their 
Dutch data, the higher usage of TAW is positively associated with sales growth in enterprises 
with R&D but negatively associated with sales growth where the enterprise has no R&D 
activities.  The authors speculate that innovative R&D firms were using TAW to 
complement existing employees in a growth strategy whereas non-innovative firms without 
R&D were downsizing, substituting TAW for employees.  Functional flexibility, on the other 
hand, is positively associated with both employment and sales growth. Arvanitis (2005) finds 
the use of temporary workers has no significant effect on the sales per employee of Swiss 
firms, nor on the introduction of process innovations.  However, it did appear to be 
associated with the introduction of product innovations. Using panel data for German 
manufacturing firms Nielen and Schiersch (2011) find a u-shaped relationship between a 
proxy for TAW as a percentage of total employment at the firm and firm competitiveness 
measured in terms of unit labour costs. 
 
III. Data and Estimation Techniques 
The data are the 1998 and 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS 
2004).  The analysis exploits four elements of the survey.  The first is the 2004 management 
interview, conducted face-to-face with the most senior workplace manager responsible for 
employee relations. The response rate was 64%. This was linked to the second element, the 
Financial Performance Questionnaire (FPQ), a short paper questionnaire completed by the 
individual responsible for financial matters at the workplace (response rate 47%). Our cross-
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sectional analyses of workplace performance are confined to the sub-sample of workplaces 
with valid FPQ data. The third element was a panel survey of workplaces initially interviewed 
in 1998.  A random sub-set of these workplaces were re-interviewed in 2004 permitting 
analyses of the links between TAW usage in 1998 and subsequent financial performance 
(response rate 80%).  The fourth and final element was an employee survey based on a self-
completion questionnaire distributed to a randomly selected set of employees at the 
workplaces interviewed for the 2004 cross-sectional survey. (In the case of workplaces with 
fewer than 26 employees, all employees were surveyed).  The overall response rate for the 
employee questionnaire was 61%.5 Analyses of employees' wages and wellbeing offer insights 
into the mechanisms linking TAW with workplace performance. 
The estimating sub-sample is all private sector workplaces with complete information 
on the variables used in the analysis. The estimating sub-sample for the employee-level 
analysis is the employees surveyed in private sector workplaces in 2004.  All models are run 
with sampling weights that are the inverse of the probability of sample selection. The 
weights for the FPQ productivity models and the employee wage and worker wellbeing 
models also adjust for non-response to the FPQ and employee questionnaires respectively.6 
A robust estimator is used to account for heteroskedasticity.  
Three measures of labour productivity are analysed.  The first is taken from HR 
managers’ responses to the question:  ‘Compared with other establishments in the same 
industry, how would you assess your workplace’s labour productivity?’  We run probit 
analyses for a dummy variable where workplaces answering ‘a lot better than average’ score 
"1" and zero otherwise. Seven percent of the survey-weighted estimation sample scored 1 on 
this dummy. 
                                                 
5 For full details of the survey see Kersley et al. (2006) and Chaplin et al. (2005). 
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Subjective measures of productivity dominate the British literature but there is some 
debate about the properties of these data and their value in estimating influences on 
productivity compared with accounting-type data.7  We therefore also run analyses on two 
accounting measures collected for the first time in WERS using the FPQ. 8 The first is the 
log of gross output per worker (sometimes referred to as ‘average labour productivity’) and is 
derived by dividing total employment at the workplace into the total value of sales of goods 
and services over the past year.  The second measure is the log of gross value-added per 
worker and is derived by subtracting the total value of purchases of goods, materials and 
services from total sales, and then dividing this figure by total employment.9  Both 
accounting measures of productivity are estimated using ordinary least squares. Final 
estimation samples exclude those with missing data and some with outlier values on 
dependent variables.10   
Sales per employee and value added per employee are highly correlated with one 
another.  However, the subjective measure of productivity relative to the industry average is 
not strongly correlated with the accounting measures, suggesting that it contains different 
information from the other two dependent variables (Forth and McNabb, 2007). 
Cross-sectional analyses of workplace financial performance estimate effects on HR 
managers’ responses to the question:  ‘Compared with other establishments in the same 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 For full details see Chaplin et al. (2005). 
7 See Kersley et al. (2006: 287-289) and Forth and McNabb (2007). 
8 A copy of the FPQ questionnaire can be downloaded at: 
http://www.wers2004.info/wers2004/crosssection.php#fpq. 
9 The mean for log sales per employee was 4.107 with a standard error of 0.072.  In deriving logged value added 
per employee for estimation a constant was added to push the whole distribution above zero.  The mean was 
6.497 with a standard error of 0.0038. 
10 Most of the data provided related to an accounting period ending in 2004, the remainder providing data for a 
period ending in 2003.  Where data did not relate to a full calendar year it was adjusted accordingly.  
Workplaces with values below the 2.5th percentile and above the 97.5th percentiles of the productivity 
distributions were classified as outliers and removed from the analyses. 
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industry, how would you assess your workplace’s financial performance?’  We run probit 
analyses for a dummy variable where workplaces answering ‘a lot better than average’ score 
"1" and zero otherwise. Twelve percent of the survey-weighted workplaces scored 1 on this 
variable. This is supplemented with a panel analysis of changes in workplace financial 
performance over the period 1998-2004.  Using workplace-level predictors collected in the 
1998 survey we estimate probit models for a dummy variable identifying those workplaces 
where the manager believed the workplace's performance was better than the trend for the 
industry.11 Forty-seven percent of weighted panel survey workplaces scored 1 on this 
variable. We were unable to conduct difference estimators or workplace fixed effects models 
because we lack an identical dependent variable in both years.   
In the employee-level cross-sectional analysis for 2004 we focus on four outcomes: 
wages, perceptions of hard work, job satisfaction, and job anxiety.  As noted in Section II, 
TAW may lower overall labour costs at the workplace, or exert downward pressure on 
permanent employees' wages through a wage disciplining effect, as may occur where TAW 
are credible substitutes for permanent employees. Alternatively, employees' wages may rise in 
the presence of TAW for a variety of reasons. For instance, employees in TAW workplaces 
may be offered efficiency wages, akin to a compensating wage differential, for working in a 
                                                 
11 Managers were asked "Generally speaking, in establishments in your industry or field has the financial 
performance...improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated since 1998?" Depending on the response to this 
question managers were then asked one of three questions. Those who thought industry performance had 
improved were asked "would you say that, compared with the improvement in the average financial 
performance of establishments in your industry or field, your own establishment has improved at a faster rate, 
improved at a similar rate, improved at a slower rate, remained static or actually deteriorated?" Those saying 
industry performance had remained more or less the same were asked "would you say that compared with the 
stability in the average financial performance of establishments in your industry or field your own workplaces 
has...improved, remained stable like the rest of the industry, actually deteriorated?" Those saying industry 
financial performance had deteriorated were asked "would you say that compared with the deterioration in the 
average performance of establishments in your industry or field, the financial performance of your own 
workplaces has actually improved, remained stable, deteriorated at the same rate as the rest of the industry, or 
deteriorated at a faster rate than the rest of the industry?"  Where managers rated their own workplace's 
performance as better than the trend in the industry they scored "1" on the dummy variable, zero otherwise. 
There are no panel data items allowing us to track labour productivity over time. 
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high-effort environment.  Alternatively, employees may extract a wage premium if they are 
complements to TAW and are thus able to bargain over the additional rents accruing 
through the deployment of TAW. If TAW results in labour intensification for employees this 
may be apparent in subjective wellbeing measures and perceptions of how hard they are 
required to work, while the perception that TAW threaten job security should directly affect 
satisfaction with job security.  We explore these avenues by incorporating measures of TAW 
at workplace and occupation level in employee-level analyses.  (Full descriptions of the 
dependent variables are presented in the results section).  
We use three TAW measures.  The first is a dummy (0,1) variable identifying the 
presence of any TAW at the workplace.  Fourteen percent of the estimation sample scored 1 
on this dummy variable in survey weighted data. The second is a set of dummy variables 
identifying the presence of any TAW in each of the (up to) nine single-digit occupations in 
the workplace. The third TAW measure is a dummy (0,1) used in the employee analysis to 
identify whether or not the occupation that the employee works in at the workplace contains 
any TAW.12 All control variables are reported in the footnotes below the results tables.  
The causal impact of TAW on productivity and performance is difficult to identify 
due to the potential endogeneity of TAW that arises from the non-random usage of TAW by 
workplaces.  It is possible that high performing workplaces may be the most likely to use 
TAW.  Alternatively, low performing firms may be most likely to use TAW if, for example, 
they resort to it as a means of overcoming short-term financial constraints on recruiting 
employees or as a means of cost-cutting, both of which are identified among the reasons for 
using TAW above.  In both cases estimates of TAW effects on performance will suffer from 
                                                 
12 This variable is constructed by linking management level data on the incidence of TAW at the workplace in 
each single digit occupation to the occupational classification of employees collected in the employee 
questionnaire. 
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biases induced by reverse causation.  We use various strategies to help tackle this issue.  First, 
we present panel estimates which condition on initial financial performance and other 
baseline predictors when estimating TAW effects on establishment financial performance 
relative to the industry trend. Second, in our cross-sectional estimates we account for the 
initial performance of the workplace by conditioning on the trend in employment at the 
workplace over the previous year.  Finally, we explore possible mechanisms by which TAW 
may influence workplace financial performance by examining their effects on employee 
wages, hard work, and wellbeing. 
 
IV. Results 
Table 1 reports results for the three measures of labour productivity and the single 
measure of financial performance described above.  The models contain baseline controls 
described in footnote 3 to the table.  The model fit statistics indicate that the models 
perform well in accounting for a sizeable degree of variance in these outcomes.  The model 
of sales per employee accounts for almost half the variance among private sector workplaces, 
while the value-added per employee model accounts for around one-quarter of the variance. 
The presence of TAW at the workplace is not significantly associated with labour 
productivity, although its positive association with sales per employee is on the margins of 
statistical significance.  However, TAW is positively associated with workplace financial 
performance. In the absence of controls, the raw coefficient is 0.48 (t=1.79). The coefficient 
rises to 0.71 when controlling for other factors, and is more precisely estimated (t=2.27). 
The effect is quite large: the average marginal effect of moving from no TAW to TAW is to 
increase the probability of having financial performance that is a lot better than the industry 
average by 11 percent. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In financial performance models replacing the TAW dummy with dummies 
identifying the presence of TAW in each occupation (the six lower occupations plus a single 
dummy for the top three occupations),  the dummies are jointly statistically significant at a 90 
percent confidence level.  TAW in skilled trades and personal services are positively 
significantly associated with financial performance a lot better than the industry average.13  
The association between TAW and improved financial performance is also apparent 
in the panel of workplaces followed up between 1998 and 2004. The percentage of managers 
who believed the workplace's performance was better than the trend for the industry over 
the period 1998-2004 was 54 percent among those with TAW in 1998, compared with 44 
percent among those with no TAW in 1998.  This effect is apparent having controlled for 
workplace characteristics (coefficient 0.49, t=2.30).14 Once again, the marginal effect of 
moving from no TAW to TAW is substantial (17 percent) and statistically significant. 
Replacing the TAW dummy with dummies for the presence of TAW in nine single-digit 
occupations reveals that they are jointly statistically significant in the model (p=0.032). The 
presence of TAW in two occupations (sales and unskilled operatives) was positively and 
significantly associated with improved financial performance relative to the industry's trend 
performance. 
                                                 
13 Full models are available from the author on request. 
14
 The panel analyses was survey weighted and run on 544 unweighted observations. It included the 
following controls measured in 1998: financial performance, industry (11 dummies), establishment aged 
25+ years, single-establishment firm, foreign owned, total number of employees, union recognition. These 
variables were jointly significant (p=0.024). 
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To explore possible mechanisms by which TAW may positively affect workplace 
financial performance we turn to the 2004 employee survey which is linked to the workplace 
data.   We find that the presence of TAW at a workplace has a substantial impact on 
employees' experiences at the workplace.  Results are presented in Table 2.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We find the presence of TAW at the workplace and the presence of TAW in the 
employee's own occupation within a workplace are not associated with employees' responses 
to the question "My job requires that I work very hard" (Model (1)).  This suggests that there 
may be no direct impact of TAW on the intensity with which employees work, but it could 
also reflect the precise wording of the question which focuses on the demands of the job.  
However, conditioning on a range of variables including wages, the presence of TAW at the 
workplace is negatively associated with employees' wellbeing as indicated by lower overall 
job satisfaction, lower satisfaction with non-pecuniary aspects of the job, and higher job 
anxiety (Models (2), (3) and (4) respectively). The effect is not driven by the presence of 
TAW in the employee's occupation, as might be expected if employees were primarily 
concerned about a threat to their jobs arising from substitution by TAW.  Instead, it's the 
presence of any TAW at the workplace that matters. Finally, log wage regressions indicate a 
wage premium for employees associated with the presence of TAW of around 9 percent. 
However, in the case of employees with TAW in their occupation, this is offset by a wage 
penalty of around 5 percent.  
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V. Conclusions 
Using nationally representative workplace data for Britain we find the use of 
temporary agency workers (TAW) is positively associated with financial performance in the 
British private sector.  The association between TAW and improved financial performance is 
apparent in both cross-sectional and panel data. The effects are quantitatively quite 
substantial.  However, TAW is only very weakly associated with higher sales per employee 
and it is not associated with value added per employee.  Nor is it associated with how hard 
employees in TAW workplaces say they have to work.   
Analyses of employee data provide clues as to the mechanism by which TAW affects 
financial performance.  The presence of TAW at the workplace is negatively associated with 
employees' wellbeing. The effect is not driven by the presence of TAW in the employee's 
occupation, as might be expected if employees were primarily concerned about a threat to 
their jobs arising from substitution by TAW.  Instead, it's the presence of any TAW at the 
workplace that matters. One possible interpretation of these results is that workplace regimes 
which harbour any TAW are more labour intensive and perhaps more cost conscious that 
workplace regimes which do not resort to TAW.  If so the TAW effect could be picking up a 
labour intensification effect which operates at the level of the whole workplace.  
We also find a wage premium of 9 percent for employees associated with the 
presence of TAW. However, in the case of employees with TAW in their occupation, this is 
partly offset by a wage penalty of around 5 percent. Thus it would appear that the presence 
of TAW in one's occupation may exert downward wage pressure on the wages paid to 
employees in that occupation, resulting in cost savings for the employer. The wage premium 
attached to having any TAW at the workplace may indicate employers sharing rents with 
employees which accrue from the deployment of TAW. Taken together these findings are 
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consistent with TAW having an adverse effect on employees' experiences at work, perhaps 
due a more labour intensive regime, one which is only partly compensated for with higher 
wages. We have presented evidence to indicate that this is profitable from an employer 
perspective. 
Despite some support for causal inferences from the panel analysis, one should be 
cautious in interpreting the results presented here as causal. Future research could usefully 
explore whether results differ using alternative identification strategies, under different 
economic conditions, and whether they differ according to the regulatory and institutional 
setting in which firms operate.   
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Table 1: Correlation between TAW incidence and workplace productivity and performance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 labprod finperf lnte lngvae 
Any TAW -0.31 0.71 0.23 0.01 
 (0.89) (2.27)** (1.60) (0.58) 
Constant -1.90 -1.53 4.80 6.57 
 (2.16)** (1.86)* (12.73)*** (228.14)*** 
Obs 511 599 569 573 
Model fit p>f 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared - - 0.48 0.27 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variables and estimation techniques are as follows.  LABPROD: (0, 1) dummy variable where 1=manager says labour productivity 
is a lot better than the industry average, zero otherwise. Probit estimator. FINPERF:(0,1) dummy variable where 1=manager says financial 
performance is a lot better than the industry average, zero otherwise. Probit estimator. LNTE: log sales per employee. OLS estimator.  LNGVAE: log 
value added per employee. OLS estimator.   
(2) T-stats are in parentheses. *=significant at a 90% confidence level.  **=significant at a 95% confidence level. ***=significant at a 99% confidence 
level or above. 
(3) All models contain the following controls: log employment, single independent workplace, industry dummies (12), workplace aged 25+ years, if 
domestically owned, union recognition, core occupation dummies (8), region dummies (11); workplace employment rose in the last year; workplace 
employment fell over the last year. 
(4) For full versions of these models are available from the author on request. 
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Table 2: Correlation between TAW and employees' work experience 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Hard Work Job sat. Non-pecuniary 
job sat. 
Job anxiety Log wages 
Any TAW -0.01 -0.49 -0.46 0.44 0.09 
 (0.48) (2.64)*** (2.85)*** (2.88)*** (3.94)*** 
TAW in own 
occupation 
-0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 
 (1.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.41) (2.83)*** 
Constant 3.05 -0.51 -0.22 -8.25  1.46 
 (22.08)*** (0.59) (0.28) (11.63)*** (13.90)*** 
R-squared 0.09 0.30 0.31 0.18 0.47 
Notes: 
(1) N=11,412 employees in all models. All models are linear estimation with survey weights to account for probability of selection and non-response. 
(2) The dependent variables are as follows.  Hard Work: (1,5:) ordinal responses from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" in response to the 
statement "My job requires that I work very hard". Job satisfaction (-16,16): additive scale based on employee responses to: “How satisfied are you 
with the following aspects of your job?... achievement you get from your work; the scope for using your own initiative; the amount of influence you 
have over your job; the training you receive; the amount of pay you receive; your job security; the work itself; the amount of involvement you have in 
decision-making at this workplace?” Responses are coded along a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied”. Principal 
component analysis of the job satisfaction items indicates one factor, which explains over 50 percent of variance. When combining the eight items 
into a single scale, we achieve a reliability statistic of 0.85, as measured by the Cronbach’s alpha. Our single summative job satisfaction score 
rescales the five-point scores for each measure into (-2, 2) scales where ‘-2’ is “very dissatisfied” and ‘2’ is “very satisfied”.  Higher scores denote 
greater satisfaction. Non-pecuniary job satisfaction (-14, 14): the same scale minus the responses on pay satisfaction. Job anxiety (-12,12): an 
additive scale based on responses to “Thinking of the past few weeks how much of the time has your job made you feel each of the following.. tense, 
calm, relaxed, worried, uneasy, content?”  Responses are coded on a 5-point scale: “all of the time”, “most of the time”, “some of the time”, 
“occasionally”, “never”. combine the six items into a single scale. This anxiety-contentment scale has a reliability statistic of 0.85 as measured by the 
Cronbach’s alpha. Our single summative job anxiety (JA) score rescales the five-point scores for each measure into (-2, 2) scales where ‘-2’ is 
“never” and ‘2’ is “all of the time” having reverse-coded the positive affect items such that higher scores indicate higher job anxiety. Log wages: 
Employees are asked: “How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other deductions are taken out? If your pay before tax changes 
from week to week because of overtime, or because you work different hours each week, think about what you earn on average.” Responses are 
recorded in fourteen bands ranging from “£50 or less per week (£2,600 per year or less)” through to “£871 or more per week (£45,241 or more per 
year)”. Employees are also asked: “How many hours, including overtime or extra hours, do you usually work in your job each week? Exclude meal 
breaks and time taken to travel to work.” To obtain hourly wages we obtain lower and upper bounds for the wage by dividing through by continuous 
hours and take the mid-point from each band (top-coding the open-ended upper band by multiplying the lower band by 1.5).  We drop the 155 cases 
whose hourly wage falls four standard deviations or more away from the mean hourly wage. 
(3) The following variables are common to all five models: male; disabled; white British; age (9 dummies), academic qualifications (8 dummies), 
union membership, hours worked, hours squared, overtime hours, supervisor, degree of job autonomy, establishment size, establishment size 
squared, single-establishment firm, industry (11 dummies), local unemployment rate, urban area. Models (1)-(4) condition on wages. Models (2) to 
(5) condition on job requiring hard work. 
(4) T-stats are in parentheses. *=significant at a 90% confidence level.  **=significant at a 95% confidence level. ***=significant at a 99% confidence 
level or above. Standard errors are adjusted for the non-independence of employee observations arising from the workplace sampling. 
(5) For full versions of these models are available from the author on request. 
 
